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This article proffers a personhood-based conception of a meaningful life. I look 
into the ethical structure of the salient idea of personhood in African philosophy 
to develop an account of a meaningful life. In my view, the ethics of personhood is 
constituted by three components, namely (1) the fact of being human, which informs 
(2) a view of moral status qua the capacity for moral virtue, and (3) which specifies 
the final good of achieving or developing a morally virtuous character. In light of 
the ethics of personhood, I will propose the view that a meaningful life is a function 
of achieving moral excellence or perfection. The moral perfection proposed here, to 
embody a meaningful life, is of a deontological and satisficing kind. The achievement 
of satisfactory levels of moral excellence, within sociopolitical and moral limits, 
captures the essence of a meaningful life. I conclude the article by considering 
objections against the view proposed here. 
Introduction 
In this article, I explore the question of a meaningful life in light of African moral thought. To 
construct an African account of a meaningful life, I will employ the ethical concept of personhood 
salient among African cultures. Roughly, I think of a meaningful life as one that matters or is morally 
significant. We tend to care about lives that (morally) matter or are (morally) significant because 
we deem them to be objectively fulfilling. The objective status of meaningful lives being fulfilling 
renders them as choice-worthy, i.e. the kinds of positive lives that anyone ought to aspire to live. The 
idea of personhood, in African philosophy, refers to an individual leading a morally flourishing life. 
I will unfold the three components of the ethics of personhood to account for the meaningfulness of 
life. The central aim of this article is to construct an African account of a meaningful life by way of 
a philosophical exposition of the idea of personhood. 
This article emerges out of two crucial considerations concerning the idea of personhood in 
African philosophy. The first, the idea of personhood, occupies an important place in the discourse 
of African (moral) philosophy. Dismas Masolo (2010, 135) informs us that the idea of personhood 
embodies “the pinnacle of an African difference in philosophical theory”. I understand this to mean 
that the idea of personhood can contribute some distinctive insights in moral philosophy. Kevin 
Behrens (2013, 105) augments Masolo’s view by noticing “the central place personhood is taken 
to fill in African philosophy”. He continues to remark that personhood is “also foundational and 
characteristic of African philosophical thought” (ibid.). If the idea of personhood is so crucial in 
African ethics then it is reasonable to believe that it might offer us under-explored resources to 
reflect on the question of a meaningful life. 
I draw the second consideration from Kwasi Wiredu, one of the leading scholars of African 
philosophy, who has also extensively contributed to the ethical idea of personhood (see 1992; 2004; 
2008; 2009). In one instance, Wiredu (2009, 16) informs us that “[t]he philosophical implications of 
the normative conception of a person are legion”. In this particular essay, Wiredu only had space to 
explore the linguistic and normative implications of this moral concept. In this article, I join these 
scholars of African thought in the project of exploring the manifold implications of personhood (see 
Tshivhase 2013; Matolino 2014; Oyowe 2014; 2018; Ikuenobe 2015; 2016; 2018; Molefe 2018; 
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2019a). Specifically, I will be considering the implications of personhood for the question of a 
meaningful life. 
I begin by clarifying the nature and aims of this project, which is both exploratory and expository. 
It is exploratory insofar as it will invoke the idea of personhood to investigate whether it might 
embody a robust account of a meaningful life. The aim, at least at this stage, is to sketch a provisional 
account of a meaningful life. It is in light of the provisional account I will produce here that scholars 
can assess its overall viability and promise to contribute on philosophical discourses of the question 
of a meaningful life. This project is expository insofar as it aims to illuminate on the theoretical 
ideas inherent in the discourse of personhood to capture an account of a meaningful life. In other 
words, the overall strength of this article will be on its elucidation rather than on its justifying the 
resultant view of a meaningful life proposed here. Put differently, the aim is to offer a preliminary 
sketch of an African-inspired account of a meaningful life. The logic of taking such an approach is 
the simple one of pointing the reader to an idea that may after careful elucidation prove to warrant 
serious attention in the literature. 
The article proceeds as follows: To begin, I clarify how I will be using the idea of a meaningful 
life. Secondly, I distinguish three concepts of “personhood” in African philosophy, which will be 
essential for my account of the ethics of personhood, namely: personhood as (1) human nature; 
(2) moral status; and (3) moral virtue. Next, I articulate a moral account of personhood. The moral 
view is constituted by (2) moral status – certain capacities of human nature that are essential for 
morality, and (3) moral virtue – the final good of this ethical system. Both (2) and (3) are based on 
(1) human nature – the metaphysical fact of being human. I will account for moral status in terms 
of our capacity for moral virtue. I will observe that we expect human beings to pursue and achieve 
(3) the final good of moral excellence or perfection because human beings have (2) the capacity for 
moral virtue. I will clarify that the moral perfection anticipated here is not one that we maximise, 
but is of a satisficing kind. Next, I will consider the view of a meaningful life entailed by the idea 
of personhood. I will conclude the article by considering objections against the view advanced here. 
The idea of a meaningful life 
In what follows, I stipulate the model I use to account for a meaningful life. I construct this model 
from Christine Korsgaard’s essay – “Two Distinctions of Goodness” (1983). In that essay, among 
other things, she points us to “three kinds of judgments of goodness that we make” in moral 
philosophy (109). One of these judgements encapsulate the model of a meaningful life that I have 
in mind, which she expresses in this fashion: “We judge something to be good of its kind when we 
judge it to have the virtues appropriate to that kind” (109). 
On this view, a meaningful life is a function of something being the good of its kind, which 
is evidenced by it having virtues appropriate to its kind. In other words, on this view, you have 
something, some entity, whose aim is to attain or manifest the good of its kind, which is a function 
of reaching a particular state of virtue. We can think “something to be good of its kind” to refer to 
a natural kind, an entity, which has an ontological make-up that is teleologically oriented (Sober 
2002). I talk of “an ontological make-up that is teleologically oriented” to refer to an entity that can 
unfold itself to evince virtues characteristic of its kind. In other words, this “something” (entity) has 
the potential in its nature to express certain kinds of virtues. The development and manifestation 
of these virtues is important because it indicates a life that is going well insofar as the virtues that 
attend its existence are those we characterise in terms of “final goods”, i.e. goods that we value for 
their own sake. 
In this sense, the goodness of the entity in question is recognised through its evincing virtues 
appropriate to its kind. We can think of the virtues that it evinces in terms of final goods. The virtues 
in question are an expression of a final good since it is a function of her nature to manifest them 
as she unfolds, which we ought to value for their own sake. Thaddeus Metz (2013, n.p.; emphasis 
added) comments on a meaningful life as “construed as accounts of which final ends a person 
ought to realize in order to have a life that matters” is instructive. In my view, a meaningful life is a 
function of an entity being the good of its kind insofar as it realises virtues appropriate to its kind. 
The final good, a moral end, to be realised is a function of the kind of a thing a human being is, on 
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my part, and I will make sense of this moral end in terms of personhood, which prescribes moral 
virtue or excellence as the final end. 
To exemplify the heuristic value of the approach proposed here, I invite the reader to consider the 
life of Sisyphus, a character in Greek mythology. The gods punished Sisyphus to push a rock up 
the mountain and when at the top of the mountain, let it roll down again. He would then have to go 
down, and roll it up again; and, he is required to do so forever. Philosophers invoke this myth to give 
us a practical case of a life that is meaningless and absurd. Two facts capture the meaninglessness 
of Sisyphus’ existence. 
First, the activity of rolling the stone up the mountain is purposeless. That is, it adds no value to 
the world and to Sisyphus’ existence. The activity of rolling the stone does not improve Sisyphus’ 
life and the world in any significant way. The activity is useless. This activity wastes Sisyphus’ 
existence. Secondly, this activity does not fundamentally relate, connect and nurture some of his 
distinctive abilities, talents and skills as the kind of an entity he is. His existence as a human being 
and his distinctive abilities – his rational powers, language and ability to communicate, and cultural 
and aesthetic abilities and powers – remain unused and uncultivated. His existence as a human 
being is wasted and unattended to. The virtues associated and expected of his kind will never be 
developed; hence, his life is one that is meaningless. 
The approach I propose above to think of a meaningful life does have resources to account for 
why Sisyphus existence is meaningless. Firstly, Sisyphus’ life is not connected to any fundamental 
value whose pursuit or production makes his existence matter. My approach, primarily, accounts for 
a life that matters in terms of some final good, be it pleasure, preference satisfaction or whatever else 
is thought to make a life to go best (Parfit 2002). On my part, I will invoke the idea of personhood 
that prescribes the value of moral perfection or excellence as the final good to be realised. Secondly, 
a life goes well for the entity in question if it manifests or develops virtues associated with its kind. 
That is, it becomes the best of its kind insofar as it develops itself as far as is possible. Sisyphus is 
engaged in an activity that does not help him to develop virtues associated with his kind. In fact, this 
activity wastes his existence and subjects him to a life where he neglects what is distinctive about 
himself as a kind of a thing he is. Hence, his existence is meaningless. 
The concepts of personhood in African philosophy 
Scholars of the discourse of personhood in African philosophy usually point to the ambiguity and 
confusion surrounding this term in the literature (see Wiredu 1996; Oyowe 2014; Ikuenobe 2016; 
Molefe 2019a). Kwasi Wiredu identifies two distinct concepts of personhood: the ontological and 
normative (1996; 2009). The ontological notion refers to the fact of being human or the idea of 
human nature. At a philosophical level, this idea involves a search for an account of what constitutes 
human nature – is it entirely material or a combination of the material and spiritual components 
(Gyekye 1995; Kaphagwani 2004; Ikuenobe 2016). The normative concept of personhood involves 
grading a human life in terms of excellence or virtue, relative to the quality of the moral agent’s 
performance (Menkiti 1984; Gyekye 1992; Wiredu 1992). Personhood, in this sense, refers to a 
status an individual acquires through consistent moral effort (Gyekye 1997). To say of some moral 
agent that she is a person is to approve of the quality of her character. 
For another crucial clarification of the ideas of personhood, consider Kevin Behrens’ (2013) 
distinction of the patient-centred and agent-centred notions of personhood. I will not say much 
on the agent-centred notion of personhood since it is the same as what I described above as the 
normative notion (see Behrens 2013; Molefe 2020a). Behrens accounts for the patient-centred notion 
of personhood in the following terms. Firstly, he observes that it is normative or moral in nature. 
Secondly, he accounts for such a value of being a person in terms of certain metaphysical capacities 
or properties possessed by the individual in question. The patient-centred notion embodies a view 
of personhood that assigns value to the individual relative to whether she possesses the relevant 
metaphysical capacities or not. The patient-centred notion is tantamount to the technical idea of 
moral status in moral philosophy that identifies entities (moral patients) that are a part of the moral 
community as far as they possess the relevant metaphysical capacities (see Behrens 2013). 
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To have moral status means to be morally significant and, consequent to this fact, to be owed moral 
respect (DeGrazia 2008). The moral significance arises on grounds directly related to the nature of 
the entity in question. In other words, this entity is morally significant insofar as it possesses the 
relevant metaphysical capacities or properties. The possession of these metaphysical capacities or 
properties makes it a bearer of intrinsic value – a person (Kaufmann 2010). It is in virtue of it being 
a bearer of intrinsic value that we owe it direct duties of respect (Toscano 2011). Different theories 
of moral status account for it differently insofar as they invoke different metaphysical properties 
(see Kant 1996; Singer 2009; Nussbaum 2011). 
Above, we detailed three concepts of personhood: personhood as (1) human nature, (2) moral 
status, and (3) moral virtue. It is crucial to notice that the first notion of personhood, as a reference 
to a human being with particular ontological features characteristic of its kind, is foundational 
insofar as it informs the other notions of personhood, moral status and moral virtue – this claim will 
be clearer later in the article. In other words, we first need a human being in order to predicate the 
properties of moral status and that of moral virtue. It is crucial to notice that the idea of personhood 
qua being human is ontological insofar as it is descriptive of the human nature. The second idea 
of personhood qua moral status, predicated of human nature without regard to performance, 
is “onto-moral” insofar as the value it assigns to a human being, for example, is a function of 
possessing those kinds of ontological capacities that are crucial for the entity being the distinctive 
kind of a thing that it is. The third idea of personhood qua moral virtue, predicated of a moral agent 
relative to the quality of her moral conduct, is a moral notion approving of her good character. 
I am aware that discussions of the concept of personhood commonly single out personhood qua 
moral virtue as the salient feature of this moral view, which, given varying goals attending these 
scholars’ projects, might be justified. Note, for example, these scholars are wont to claim that the 
idea of personhood qua moral virtue is “more dominant” (Ikuenobe 2006, 128), “the core of African 
cultural traditions” (Wiredu 2009, 13), “greater emphasis is placed [on it]” (Kaphagawani 2004, 
334) than the ontological one. This kind of emphasis is crucial particularly if the goal is to clarify 
the final good characteristic of the ethics of personhood. Below, the reader will realise that I develop 
an account that weaves together the three notions of personhood to proffer a clearer ethical vision 
of what I call the ethics of personhood, which will inform the view of a meaningful life anticipated 
here. 
Personhood as a moral theory 
In my view, the ethics of personhood is constituted by three components: (1) the fact of being 
human; (2) distinctive features of human nature that make moral perfection possible – moral status; 
and (3) the final good posited by the idea of personhood – moral perfection or excellence. To begin, 
it is crucial to notice that African scholars usually invoke the idea of human nature as primary in the 
discourse of personhood. Note, for example, this comment by Ramose (2003, 413; emphasis added) 
– “…the concept of a person in African thought takes the fact of being a human being for granted”. 
It is assumed that one cannot discuss the concept of personhood without in the first place admitting 
the “human existence” of the human being upon whom personhood is to be conferred. 
Here, Ramose distinguishes the fact of being as necessary and presupposed in the discourse of 
personhood qua moral virtue. This kind of distinction of these two concepts should not be a surprise 
given the tendency in the literature by scholars to distinguish between the ontological and normative 
personhood. For example, consider Wiredu (2009, 16):
Take, for instance, the Akan word for a person, which is Onipa. A little understanding of 
Akan will reveal that the word is ambiguous. In contexts of normative comment, the word 
means a human individual of a certain moral and social standing, as we have explained. On 
the other hand, in narrative contexts, it means simply a human being. 
Here, Wiredu points us again to the distinction between the fact of being human and being a person. 
The former refers to the metaphysical fact of being human, and the latter to a moral judgement 
that recognises and approves of the quality of the character of the moral agent. The question that 
emerges is: why is this distinction crucial? It is important for two reasons. The first reason revolves 
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around the goal of conceptual precision, where we avoid ambiguities and conceptual confusion in 
our philosophical engagement. The second reason, which is more important in this article, points 
to the belief that human nature has a distinctive capacity or ability that metaphysically grounds 
the normative idea of personhood qua moral virtue. In other words, there is a distinctive aspect 
of human nature that explains our belief that human beings can achieve personhood qua moral 
perfection. 
To point to the distinctive ability of human nature to pursue moral virtue is to anticipate another 
crucial distinction. We can now distinguish the fact of being human and the idea of moral status. 
The logic for this second distinction is the recognition that it is not every capacity associated with 
being human or, their nature, that is crucial for the possibility of morality qua moral virtue. For 
example, the fact that we are bipedal beings, we can sing and dance, though important human 
functions in other regards are not essential to the possibility of moral excellence. The fact of being 
one-legged has nothing to do with a moral agent’s ability to pursue moral virtue. The idea of moral 
status identifies those capacities of human nature that make them morally significant and, in virtue 
of which, human beings can pursue moral perfection. African scholars keep pointing us to the view 
that there are human capacities that are relevant for the possibility and pursuit of morality (moral 
virtue). Note, for example, Sebidi (1988, 84) emphasis added observes that 
[f]or Africans, human nature is capable of increasing or decreasing almost to a point of 
total extinction. There are actions…that are conducive to the enhancement or growth of a 
person’s nature, just as there are those which are destructive of a person’s nature. 
I understand Sebidi here to be referring to those capacities of human nature that make the pursuit 
of personhood possible. He understands these capacities to be capable of increasing (development) 
or decreasing (deterioration). For another, consider that Wiredu (2009, 15) explains an individual 
that has achieved personhood qua moral virtue as a “morally sound adult”. In the same passage, 
he continues to explain why it must be an adult; he observes that “[t]he individual will have to 
be an adult, because otherwise she has not had enough time to develop her capabilities” (2009, 
15; emphasis added).1 Still, suggesting those distinctive moral capabilities necessary for moral 
perfection, Gyekye (1992, 110; emphasis added) espouses a similar view when he observes that “[t]
he pursuit or practice of moral virtue is held as intrinsic to the conception of a person”. I understand 
Gyekye here to mean that human beings are born with certain capacities that make the pursuit of 
personhood possible. To say the practice of virtue is intrinsic to the conception of personhood points 
us to the metaphysical capacities of human nature that inform the possibility of the practice of moral 
virtue. 
The idea of moral status that specifies distinctive metaphysical features of human beings in virtue 
of which they deserve moral attention and recognition is crucial in moral philosophy. Consider, for 
example, Immanuel Kant’s (1996) categorical imperative that forbids the instrumentalisation of 
other human beings because such treatment degrades their autonomous nature (see Kaufman 2010). 
Peter Singer (2009) rests his case for animal rights on the claim that animals, like human beings, 
have the capacity for sentience, hence, we owe them equal moral consideration. Nussbaum (2011) 
offers an account of justice based on (human) basic capabilities. These accounts differ in terms of 
what they take to be distinctive capacities of human nature. Kant’s deontology posits autonomy, 
utilitarianism sentience and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach basic capabilities, and the ethics of 
personhood, an African moral view of moral status, posits the capacity for virtue. 
Until now, I have specified two components of the ethics of personhood: the fact of being human, 
and the specific human capacity that informs the possibility for moral excellence. Below, I specify 
the account of moral status that informs the final good of moral perfection. I draw the view of moral 
status embodied in the ethics of personhood in the writings of Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) and Kwame 
Gyekye (1992), leading scholars of personhood. 
1 I am aware that the claim that associates moral achievement with being an adult can be criticised for being ageist (see Manzini 2018). 
Elsewhere, I propose an interpretation of personhood that responds to this criticism (Molefe 2020a). 
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To repudiate the view that animals have rights, Menkiti (1984, 177; emphasis added) makes the 
following argument: 
…the conclusion naturally follows that the possessor of the rights in question cannot be 
other than a person. That is so because the basis of such rights ascription has now been 
made dependent on a possession of a capacity for moral sense, a capacity, which…need not 
be realized… 
I caution the reader to notice that the idea of a “person” at play here is that of moral status as 
opposed to that of moral virtue. This is so because “personhood” here is a function solely of 
possessing some capacity (note, not its use), which in turn entitles one to rights. On Menkiti’s view 
(1984, 177; emphasis added), animals lack the “the constitutive elements in the definition of human 
personhood” captured in terms of the capacity for moral sense.2 Hence, for him, to embrace animal 
rights is to “undermine…the clearness of our conception of what it means to be a person” (ibid.). 
Gyekye defends a similar view of moral status in the discourse of personhood. In his adumbration 
of personhood as a moral virtue, he argues that “…the human person [human being] is considered to 
possess an innate capacity for virtue, for performing morally right actions and, therefore, should be 
treated as a morally responsible agent” (Gyekye 1992, 116; emphasis added). Gyekye also talks of 
the innate capacity for virtue in these terms: “man [a human being] is a being endowed with moral 
sense”, which does not mean that “his virtuous character is a settled matter, but that he is capable 
of virtue” (1992, 111; emphasis added). In the light of the above, we can rightly conclude that 
human beings have moral status insofar as they have the capacity for virtue (see Molefe 2020a). The 
development and unfolding of the capacity for virtue, moral status, is the objective status of being 
human that explains why we expect human beings to pursue and achieve moral excellence (moral 
virtue). 
Now that we have a definite sense of the distinctive features of human nature that account for 
moral status qua the capacity for moral virtue, we can proceed to consider the final good of the 
ethics of personhood. The idea of personhood as a moral virtue is usually explained as some kind of 
achievement. Menkiti (1984, 171) opines that “personhood is something which has to be achieved, 
and is not given simply because one is born of human seed”. 
Wiredu (2004, 18) also notes that “[p]ersonhood, on this showing, is something of an 
achievement”. The achievement associated with personhood essentially has to do with the moral 
agent nurturing or developing “one’s distinctively human and valuable nature” qua the capacity for 
virtue (Metz 2007, 31). Scholars account for the achievement of personhood in terms of nurturing a 
virtuous character or moral excellence (Ikuenobe 2006; 2016; Molefe 2019a). 
Note, for example, that Menkiti (1984) associates the concept of personhood with moral 
excellence four times in his essay. In one instance, Menkiti speaks of personhood and excellence as 
“…the word of muntu includes an idea of excellence” (1984, 171). The isiZulu word muntu literally 
translates as “person”. Ontologically, the word muntu simply refers to the fact of being human. 
There is nothing in the ontological category of muntu, the mere fact of being human, that denotes or 
even connotes excellence.3 In this light, it must be clear that the idea of muntu under consideration 
is a normative one. When we say, one is a muntu (person) in the normative sense, we mean their life 
is characterised by moral excellence. This view is borne out by this assertion by Menkiti (1984, 172; 
emphasis added): 
…the African emphasised the rituals of incorporation and the overarching necessity 
of learning the social rules by which the community lives, so that what was initially 
biologically given can come to attain social self-hood, i.e. become a person with all the 
inbuilt excellencies implied by the term. 
Talk of inbuilt “excellencies” signals the development of the distinctive and valuable features of 
human nature to be characterised by moral perfection, that is, for the moral agent to develop a 
2 I caution the reader to note that Menkiti espouses an interpretation of personhood that denies animals rights. Elsewhere, I offer an 
interpretation of it that accommodates them in the moral community (see Molefe 2020a). 
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virtuous character which is overflowing with moral virtues or “the practice of virtue” (Gyekye 
1992, 113). Menkiti also speaks of personhood in terms “excellencies as truly definitive of a man” 
(1984, 171). He also associates personhood with “a widened maturity of ethical sense – an ethical 
maturity” (173; emphasis added). In other words, a human being achieves personhood insofar as she 
develops a good character (Gyekye 1992; Ikuenobe 2018). It is for this reason that Wiredu (2009, 
15) speaks of it as referring to “a morally sound” individual. 
From the above, we note that the idea of personhood embodies a moral view that espouses the 
development of a good character as its chief goal. I find Behrens’ (2013, 111) comments about this 
kind of a moral view to be instructive: 
Menkiti’s association of the term “excellencies” with personhood also implies that the 
becoming a person is essentially related to developing virtue. Thus, the African conception 
of personhood could be thought to propose a theory of ethics that brings to mind what 
Western philosophy calls “perfectionism”: Persons should seek to develop a good or 
virtuous nature in order to become true or fully moral persons. 
The idea of personhood embodies a perfectionist moral view, which imposes on the agent the duty 
to develop a character exuding moral excellence. To attribute personhood to some individual is to 
judge her to have successfully engaged in the process and project of character perfection (Menkiti 
2018). 
Scholars of African moral thought cite a variety of character traits (virtues) that they associate 
with personhood. Gyekye (1992, 110; 2010), for example, talking of personhood talks of the 
“excellences of character”, which “include [the virtues of] generosity, kindness, compassion, 
benevolence, respect and concern for others”. Desmond Tutu (1999, 35; emphasis added) speaks of 
an individual that has attained personhood as “… generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and 
caring and compassionate. You share what you have”.4 
Justice Yvonne Mokgoro (1998, 3) notes that personhood is characterised by “[g]roup solidarity, 
conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity, humanistic orientation and collective unity [which] 
have, among others been defined as key social values…”. From the above, we can conclude that 
personhood embodies a character-centred moral theory, where the goal of the agent is to perfect her 
character (see Ramose 1999; Shutte 2001; Van Niekerk 2007). We also note that the kinds of virtues 
that are associated with personhood are relational insofar as they embody other-regarding duties. 
Hence, we note that an individual that has personhood is one that exudes other-regarding virtues.5 
To sum up, the ethics of personhood is premised on the fact of being human. Human nature, 
among others, is characterised by the metaphysical capacity for virtue. This capacity for virtue 
specifies that property in virtue for which human beings deserve moral respect. It is the development 
of the capacity for virtue, on the part of the moral agent, that translates into personhood or moral 
perfection. A moral virtuous or perfect agent is characterised by other-regarding “excellencies” of 
character like generosity, care, compassion, friendliness, and so on. 
An objection could arise concerning a moral view that posits the realisation of moral perfection as 
the chief goal of morality. The problem, precisely, might be that this theory could be too demanding 
since it requires moral agents to pursue a goal that is impossible to achieve – moral perfection. 
Think of this objection in terms of Susan Wolf’s (1982) criticism of theories that promote a moral 
model of sainthood, which raises the concern that such a view might entail obnoxious forms of 
human existence that are single-mindedly obsessed with moral perfection to the exclusion of other 
non-moral goods that make life beautiful, meaningful and enjoyable. It is typical in non-philosophical 
discussions to hear people talk disparagingly of (moral) perfection as a dull, boring and even bland. 
My suggestion is that we need to conceive of the perfection associated with the idea of personhood 
in light of cultural, practical and moral considerations associated with it in the traditional societies. 
4	 I	am	aware	that	Tutu	talks	of	ubuntu	and	does	not	specifically	use	the	idea	of	personhood.	The	same	consideration	applies	to	other	scholars	
cited in this article, like Mokgoro, and Shutte, among others. It is my considered view that the discourse of ubuntu and personhood are the 
same (see Molefe 2019a; 2020a). 
5 Space does not quite allow me to motivate and justify why we should take seriously the moral vision of personhood. In several places, I 
have	proffered	justifications	of	personhood	as	a	moral	theory	(see	Molefe	2018;	2019a;	2020a).	
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The reason for this is that we want to have a practical and plausible vision of the ideal of moral 
perfection as much as possible. It is important, therefore, to notice that African cultures in which 
moral perfection was highly prized as a final good understood it to be contiguous and compatible 
with the pursuit of non-moral goods, which are a feature of a robust human existence (see Wiredu 
1980). In other words, African societies framed and imagined the ideal of moral perfection in 
ways that recognised the cultural dimensions of human existence. By “cultural dimensions”, I am 
referring to extensive and heterogeneous forms of human existence that find expression through 
customs, mores, taboos, religions, and economies that characterise African communities in which 
moral perfection was highly prized as a final good (see Wiredu 1980). The suggestion, then, is that 
we should not develop a conception of moral perfection that has no place for non-moral issues since 
that approach will not be consistent with the lived experience of the concept in traditional African 
cultures. Otherwise, one will not be able to make sense of why African cultures are so robust and 
diverse if all that mattered to them was the goal of moral perfection. 
The view emerging from this practical consideration is that the vision of moral sainthood 
encapsulated in the ethics of personhood is of a moderate kind. It is moderate insofar as it allows the 
moral agent space to pursue moral perfection in a way that also appreciates the fact that its pursuit 
does not exhaust the entire scope of human existence. At best, the standard of moral perfection, as 
the moral goal, dynamically influences, shapes, and is compatible with our sociocultural forms of 
existence that are non-moral. 
The major moral-theoretical challenge occasioned by espousing a moderate perfectionist moral 
view which balances the pursuit of moral perfection and cultural dimensions of human existence is 
how to justify it. I will not offer an exhaustive justification of it here, but I want to suggest that in 
African thought, morality is understood to be of a limited kind, or at least, plausible interpretations 
of it (see Wiredu 1992; Molefe 2019a). It is the view that morality is of a limited nature, in terms 
of the scope of the demands that it places on us, in the discourse of personhood qua the pursuit of 
moral perfection that accommodates the cultural dimensions of human existence. I suggest two 
reasons to justify the limited nature of morality in the discourse of personhood. 
The limited nature of morality can be justified, firstly, by the dignity of human beings that imposes 
constraints over the means we can use to pursue moral perfection. That is, we cannot pursue the goal 
of moral perfection in ways that harm, humiliate or degrade the dignity of other human beings (see 
Wiredu 1996; Ramose 2009; Kaufmann 2010). Our duty to perfect ourselves morally cannot be 
pursued by all means necessary and to every extent possible. We can only use those means that are 
respectful of others’ dignity. 
Secondly, the limits associated with the goal of moral perfection emerge in light of the fact of the 
prize placed on special relationships in the communitarian ethics characteristic of personhood (see 
Wiredu 1992; Appiah 1998; Molefe 2016; 2019a). The suggestion here is that one should pursue 
moral perfection in ways that will foster participation in one’s special relationships by faithfully 
executing one’s special obligations to them. The special duties to one’s immediate family (spousal 
relationships), children, extended families and immediate communities impose restrictions on one 
from solely focusing on gathering as much perfection as possible. 
I sum up the immediate implication of the analysis above in this fashion – the moral perfection 
associated with the idea of personhood is not one that we ought to maximise (Pettit 1989). That is, 
we are not required to make sure that we are as maximally perfect as we can be (see McNaughton 
and Rawling 1992). Rather, the moral view of personhood, accompanied by moral constraints and 
special relationships, is much more closely associated with a deontological approach. Remember, 
David McNaughton and Piers Rawling (2006), leading scholars of deontological ethics, identify 
plausible forms of it in terms of three features – constraints, special obligations, and options. A 
careful reader will notice that I have already implicitly alluded to options when I suggested that 
plausible forms of personhood ought to have space for the individual to be able to pursue non-moral 
issues (see also Molefe 2019a). 
Not only is this view of moral perfection closely associated with a deontological account, it might 
also be more accurately described as characterised by a morally satisficing moral logic. The idea of 
satisficing emerges in economics and ethics literature, among others, to eschew models that aim to 
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maximise or optimise the good. Consequentialist moral theories tend to promote the good insofar 
as they demand nothing less than the best possible outcomes, i.e. make sure that there is as much 
moral perfection as is possible (McNaughton and Rawling 1992). The satisficing moral logic is 
a moderate one insofar as it aims for the “satisfactory” or “good enough” as the goal of morality 
(Slote and Pettit 1984; Byron 2004). The moral agent is not required to maximise moral perfection, 
i.e. appreciate that there are limits to the pursuit of moral perfection and that she should be content 
with doing what is good enough given the limits imposed on her by her own and others’ dignity and 
the demands that her special relationships impose on her. 
Personhood and a meaningful life 
Now that we have a picture of personhood as a moral theory, I believe we can approximate the 
project of articulating what a meaningful life entails. Remember, we accounted for a meaningful 
life in terms of some entity being the good of its kind insofar as it manifests virtues appropriate 
to its kind. The potential of the good of human kind is encapsulated by its capacity for virtue. The 
development of the capacity for virtue embodies a meaningful life. A human being that develops 
these capacities is being true to its kind, as a kind of a thing that has the capacity for virtue. Hence, 
we observe that it is leading a meaningful life. The meaningfulness of life revolves around the 
conversion of these raw capacities to be bearers of moral excellence. Where the individual becomes 
the better of its kind. 
A meaningful life, according to this theory, is construed in terms of the agent achieving the 
moral end of moral perfection or excellence. A life that exudes moral perfection to satisfactory 
levels, given the limits associated with morality, is a meaningful one. Another way to make sense 
of this account of a meaningful life is by invoking the concept of dignity. We can now fully express 
the ethics of personhood and its account of a meaningful life in terms of the idea of dignity.6 I 
distinguish two senses of the idea of dignity: intrinsic, and inflorescent dignity (Sulmasy 2008). 
Intrinsic dignity, sometimes called status dignity, refers to the dignity one has merely because one 
possesses the relevant capacities (Miller 2017). In virtue merely of possessing these capacities 
that ground intrinsic dignity, we owe the moral patient duties of respect. In light of the ethics of 
personhood, human beings have intrinsic or status dignity insofar as they possess the capacity for 
moral virtue. Sulmasy (2008, 473; emphasis added) comments as follows regarding inflorescent 
dignity:
…inflorescent dignity is used to refer to individuals who are flourishing as human beings 
– living lives that are consistent with and expressive of the intrinsic dignity of the human. 
Thus, dignity is sometimes used to refer to a state of virtue – a state of affairs in which a 
human being habitually acts in ways that expresses the intrinsic value of the human. 
Inflorescent dignity refers to a state of virtue the agent achieves over time. The state of virtue under 
consideration emerges consequent to the agent developing those capacities that secure her status 
or intrinsic dignity. Remember, on the ethics of personhood, we have status or intrinsic dignity 
because we possess the capacity for moral virtue. The agent’s development of the capacity for virtue 
translates to moral perfection, which we can also think of in terms of a dignified existence. This kind 
of dignity is the one that we achieve relative to our efforts to attain moral perfection – achievement 
dignity. As such, a meaningful life is a function of a dignified human existence qua the development 
of the distinctive human capacity for virtue. I also emphasise that the agent is not required to live 
the best possible human life. The requirement is that the agent ought to reach satisfactory levels of 
moral excellence for her life to count as meaningful. In the next section, I consider some objections 
against this view of a meaningful life. 
6 The idea of moral status is tantamount to the idea of dignity (see Toscano 2011). The idea of moral status, at least the way I understand it, 
admits of degrees, where some entities have none, others have some and others have higher moral status (DeGrazia 2008). Some scholars 
talk of partial and full moral status (Metz 2012). The idea of full moral status is the same as that of dignity (Toscano 2011). 
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Concerns and criticisms 
Below, I consider two major criticisms against the vision of a meaningful life proposed here. The 
first concern is that the ideal of perfection or excellence could be the kind of thing that can lead to an 
unsatisfactory life. There is a sense in which this concern could be true and there is a sense in which 
it is not. I will start with the latter thought, where it is not true. If the claim is that human beings are 
endowed with the capacity to pursue moral perfection, then it is beside the point whether individuals 
will ultimately be satisfied with having led such a life. Objectively, and, morally speaking, they 
(human beings) are the kinds of things that can and ought to live morally excellent lives, if they so 
will and exert themselves. It is to live below what it means to be truly human to target any other 
goal below and beside the ideal of their moral potential. The meaningfulness of life, on this view, 
is a function of certain ontological facts riveted on the fact of being qua the capacity for virtue. It 
is to this objective fact of our human nature and human effort of perfecting it that accounts for the 
meaningfulness of life, in a crucial sense, quite beside the subjective component. 
However, holding this view does not negate the possibility that one leading a meaningful life 
might find it, in some occasions, at least, to be subjectively unsatisfying. Immediately, the case of 
Mother Teresa’s dark night of the soul presents itself.7 This consequence should not be read as an 
objection against my view because it never promised that a meaningful life is one accompanied 
by certain psychological states like that of happiness. The project of pursuing personhood could 
be burdensome and challenging in many ways, and this could very well invite varying dosages of 
unpleasantness or even misery. What might make matters worse, as practical experience has taught 
us, is that when we get involved in a process to self-improve – like completing a doctoral degree – it 
tends to be difficult and almost insurmountable. Eventually one completes it, but one may not find 
it as pleasant an experience as one anticipated it to be. The psychological reaction of dissatisfaction 
in itself, all things being equal, does not take away from the fact that one has made a significant 
achievement that is very fulfilling. Alternatively, the fact that Mother Teresa had moments were she 
felt empty does not mean her life was not overall meaningful or significant. 
Moreover, the central insight of accounting for a meaningful life in terms of personhood is the 
idea of character development and perfection. An individual with a sound character will be able to 
navigate the vicissitudes of life and the varying emotional boons and banes that comes with them. 
The quality of character – personhood – is tested and best manifested as one deals with the ups-and-
downs of emotional variations that attend different circumstances of life. The insight captured above 
is expressed well by a Yoruba proverb that states “good character is a person’s guard” (see Gyekye 
2010). In other words, an individual with a good character (personhood) is most likely to be safe 
as she goes through varying feelings and emotional challenges that attend changing circumstances 
of her existence. The ability to manage our emotions is an important part of what it means to be a 
person. 
Another objection could point out that the idea of personhood often tends to be imagined to 
essentially require relational contexts, an aspect I did not touch on. Specifically, the objection could 
be that conceptions of moral perfection like that of personhood that emphasise the importance of 
communal living might thwart and limit the life of the moral agent, which might undermine my 
attempt to appeal to it to account for a meaningful life. In several places, in my own work on the 
idea of personhood, I have reflected on this objection (see Molefe 2018; 2019a). Often, I do not take 
this objection seriously for two major reasons. 
Firstly, in my considered view, the idea of personhood (moral perfection) and the view of a 
meaningful of life it entails is, in some sense, individualistic. That is, ultimately, it is the individual 
that acquires moral perfection. The process and project of moral perfection is an individual project 
realised in light of the provisions of the community. The community, in light of Menkiti’s (1984, 
172) adumbrations, serves as a “catalyst and prescriber of norms”. The analogy of a catalyst 
and prescriber points to the instrumental role played by the community insofar as it enables the 
7 It is reported that Mother Teresa in a letter addressed to a friend notes that “[but] as for me, the silence and the emptiness is so great, that I 
look and do not see – Listen and do not hear – the tongue moves [in prayer] but does not speak…I want you to pray for me” (https://time.
com/4126238/motherteresas-crisis-of-faith/). 
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individual to pursue and achieve personhood (Molefe 2019b). I read Ikuenobe (2016, 146; emphasis 
added) as attaching an instrumentalist role to the community, when he comments that “[t]he African 
idea of communalism implies that the community with its values plays a central role in helping one 
to cultivate and then achieve the status of a morally beautiful person”. 
In this light, I submit that we should not exaggerate the role of the community. We should 
properly understand that the community plays an instrumental role in the individuals’ pursuit of 
personhood and a meaningful life. A meaningful life, ultimately, is a function of the efforts of the 
individual or moral agent assisted by the community. In actual fact, the community does not literally 
confer personhood, at best (1) it provides basic resources required for the moral agent to pursue 
a meaningful life, and (2) it recognises, note, not confers, lives of individuals that exude moral 
excellence or meaning, and regards them as objects of praise or admiration. As such, the individual 
lives a meaningful life by way of manifesting virtues associated with its kind in a communal context. 
The second response points to the fact that the ideals of freedom and autonomy, usually invoked to 
criticise the idea of personhood, often assume the liberal slant (see Tshivhase 2013). In my view, to 
criticise an African concept by an appeal to a concept interpreted through the lenses of the Western 
liberal tradition fails to be a serious objection. For example, in the Western liberal tradition emphasis 
is placed on negative freedom that requires space for non-interference as the agent independently 
decides how to imagine and implement her own conception of life (see Berlin 1958). The idea of 
autonomy prevalent in this tradition also emphasises “self-sufficiency” in decision-making, distance 
and the “in-control-agent” (Walter and Ross 2014, 16). On the other hand, in the African tradition, 
both freedom and autonomy take a relational form. Note, for example, that Ikuenobe (2015, 1005) 
associates personhood with a relational autonomy in this fashion when he argues 
that the idea of personhood in African traditions implies a relational and positive sense of 
autonomy, which involves the community helping or guiding one to use one’s ability and 
knowledge of one’s social relations and circumstances to choose freely the requisite goods 
for achieving one’s life plan. 
One’s freedom and pursuit of a meaningful life cannot be imagined outside and completely 
independent of the ever-present community that helps and guides the individual in her own 
development and pursuit of her life plan. In other words, our autonomy develops and functions in 
the context of relational resources. Hence, it is to attack a straw-man, if one decides to characterise 
the idea of personhood and the vision of a meaningful life as one that does not regard the freedom 
and autonomy of individuals. Instead, it offers an alternative vision of autonomy and freedom (see 
Siame 2000). The objection would stick, if one could prove the plausibility of the liberal view of 
freedom and autonomy and the implausibility of the relational view of autonomy and freedom. This 
debate requires its proper place and dialogue between the two traditions of philosophy, which is not 
the focus of this article. 
Conclusion 
This article proposed a provisional view of a meaningful life in light of the ethics of personhood. A 
meaningful life is a function of certain objective facts related to human existence. Specifically the 
fact that (1) as human beings (2) we have moral status because we possess the capacity for virtue, 
and (3) a good of human life involves the development and perfection of this capacity, which is the 
same as achieving personhood (moral perfection). A meaningful life is the achievement of moral 
excellence. We can also make sense of this life in terms of dignity. Human beings have intrinsic 
or status dignity because they have the capacity for virtue. Living a life dedicated to developing 
this capacity for virtue is captured in terms of achievement dignity. The achievement of dignity 
embodies a meaningful life. We also noted that the perfection imagined here should be understood 
to be characterised by a deontological and satisficing moral logic. This way of understanding 
perfection implies that it simply requires human beings to pursue satisfactory levels of perfection, 
which implies that human beings will have space to pursue non-moral issues. 
In future research, those committed to personhood and its possible contributions to the discourse 
of a meaningful life should consider the following issues: A robust defence of the idea of options 
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in relation to personhood is important since it will secure the place for non-moral excellence and 
activities, which in this article was merely motivated rather than defended. One will also need to 
demonstrate that the perfection associated with moral issues implies that the virtue of perfection 
should also characterise activities and strivings in non-moral domains. The satisficing moral logic 
associated with personhood will also require further refinement and its plausibility needs to be 
tested against other competing interpretations of personhood in the literature. Moreover, I think a 
comparative approach to the discourse of a meaningful life will reveal the promise of this view more 
fully. 
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